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Independent Fiscal Institutions in Comparative 
Constitutional Perspective 
 
 
 
Cal Viney and Thomas Poole* 
 
 
Abstract: Independent fiscal institutions (IFIs), also known as independent budget offices, fiscal 
policy councils or independent fiscal watchdogs, have become a feature of the regulatory 
landscape since the global financial crisis. This paper analyses their proliferation and seeks to 
situate them in their constitutional and institutional environment. The paper begins with an 
assessment of the two competing rationales for their existence: first, the rationale of overcoming 
deficit bias in advanced western democracies (through institutions of de-politicisation), and 
second, the rationale of overcoming information asymmetry on two planes – 
elector/government fiscal information asymmetry and legislature/executive information 
asymmetry (strategies of re-politicisation). The paper then analyses the legal and technical design 
features of two IFIs: the UK Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) and the Australian 
Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO). We hypothesise that whatever their origin, IFIs will seek to 
add functions, that these will include both inward-facing functions (e.g. official economic 
forecasting) and outward-facing functions (e.g. election policy costings), and that this expansion 
is likely to be facilitated by inter-party competition. We conclude that the IFI is best understood 
as a distinctive attempt to devise a fiscal self-binding mechanism in the interests of securing 
intergenerational constitutional justice.  
 
  
                                                      
* Cal Viney is an Australian lawyer and currently serves as a Senior Adviser to the Premier of Victoria, 
Australia. Thomas Poole is Professor of Law at the London School of Economics & Political Science. 
The authors would like to thank David Kershaw, Martin Loughlin and Niamh Moloney for their detailed 
and helpful comments and criticisms on an earlier version of the paper.  
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I.INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper examines the rise of the independent fiscal institution (IFI). A new 
feature of the regulatory landscape in most of the jurisdictions where they are to be 
found, these institutions are designed to encourage fiscal responsibility on the 
government’s exercise of its budgetary responsibilities. The IFI often forms part of 
post-Global Financial Crisis (GFC) regulatory architecture1 and is familiar to 
students of political economy and financial regulation. But even though their 
activities relate directly to government in a way that is less true of other post-GFC 
innovations, IFIs have been largely ignored in the specialist public law literature, a 
by-product of the tendency among public lawyers to overlook the political economy 
dimensions of their field.2 
This paper, the first of a projected series, seeks to bring the IFI into the public 
law fold. The project in general seeks to map the terrain for the benefit of public 
lawyers and to consider the institution from the perspective of public law. This 
paper provides a fine-grained comparative analysis of two examples of the genre 
that were introduced at roughly the same time: the UK Office for Budget 
Responsibility (OBR) and the Australian Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO). It 
examines the origins, duties and functions of the two institutions – but not at this 
point their effectiveness3 – and the way they have developed since their 
introduction. Our focus is to situate these bodies within their constitutional and 
institutional environment. This aim has influenced the process of selection.  
The paper provides a detailed comparative analysis of the selected bodies, 
framed by a general discussion of the rise of the IFI as a distinctive fiscal and 
political institution. But we work out from those studies towards some conclusions, 
tentatively advanced at this stage, about the constitutional or public law significance 
of the IFI. Our analysis of the OBR and the PBO shows how these bodies were set 
up for slightly different, if overlapping, reasons, and that their responsibilities and 
functions are correspondingly distinctive, again overlapping. But it also suggests 
some underlying commonalities, the most important of which is that they offer a 
technocratic attempt at counterbalancing the short-term bandwidth of modern 
fiscal politics. On the basis of this observation, we argue that the IFI ought to be 
                                                      
1 See Eilís Ferran, Niamh Moloney, Jennifer G. Hill and John C. Coffee, Jr, The Regulatory Aftermath of the 
Global Financial Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Julia Black, ‘Paradoxes and 
Failures: “New Governance” Techniques and the Financial Crisis’ (2012) 75 Modern Law Review 1037. 
2 See Gillian E. Metzger, ‘Through the Looking Glass to a Shared Reflection: The Evolving Relationship 
between Administrative Law and Financial Regulation’ (2015) 78 Law & Contemporary Problems 129, 145: 
‘in the 1960s and 1970s … as financial regulation dropped off the political and administrative [law] radar, 
it became more identified with the business and private-law side of law schools … This academic division 
has meant that scholars from each field often have limited familiarity with the analytic paradigms and 
core concerns that dominate the other, further reinforcing their divergence.’ 
3 As such, we do not discount the possibility that IFIs in practice turn out to be window dressing – 
examples of virtue signaling on the part of governments facing pressure from bewildered citizenries post-
GFC and looking to shore up (or restore) confidence in their fiscal decision-making competence.  
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understood as an institutional expression of what we call intergenerational constitutional 
justice. It provides, that is, a technology by means of which the interests and concerns 
of future generations are given voice and forced upon the consciences of today’s 
decision makers.  
 
 
II. THE RISE OF THE INDEPENDENT FISCAL INSTITUTION  
 
Independent Fiscal Institutions (IFI) – or independent parliamentary budget offices, 
fiscal policy councils or independent fiscal watchdogs as they are all but 
interchangeably termed – exist to provide independent and authoritative analysis of 
the public finances.4 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has employed the 
following broad definition:  
 
a permanent agency with a statutory or executive mandate to assess publicly 
and independently from partisan influence government’s fiscal policies, plans 
and performance against macroeconomic objectives relating to the long-term 
sustainability of public finances, short-medium-term macroeconomic stability, 
and other official objectives. In addition, a fiscal council can also (i) contribute 
to the use of unbiased macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts in budget 
preparation, (ii) facilitate the implementation of fiscal policy rules, (iii) cost new 
policy initiatives, and (iv) identify sensible fiscal policy options, and possibly, 
formulate recommendations.5 
 
Applying this definition identifies thirty-nine IFIs globally6 (including eighteen 
within the OECD).7 IFIs of one sort or another have existed for decades in 
countries such as Belgium (1936), the Netherlands (1945), Denmark (1962), Austria 
(1970) and the United States (1974). But most owe their origins to the surge in 
government deficits and debts during the 2008-9 global financial crisis (GFC), which 
gave impetus to the suggestion that states should apply some of the experience of 
independent central banking to the fiscal sphere. Governments resorted to the IFI 
in part to lend legitimacy to their fiscal decision-making, and bound up in the 
reaction to the socialisation of fiscal risk that was such a feature of post-crisis 
politics, draws support from the evidence: the number of IFIs has more than tripled 
since the GFC. The largest growth can be seen in the European Union (EU) 
                                                      
4 IFIs are ‘independent public institutions with a mandate to critically assess, and in some cases provide 
non-partisan advice on, fiscal policy and performance’: Lisa von Trapp, Ian Lienert and Joachim Wehner, 
‘Principles for Independent Fiscal Institutions and Case Studies’ (2015) 2 OECD Journal on Budgeting, 
11. 
5 Xavier Debrun and Tidane Kinda, ‘Strengthening Post-Crisis Fiscal Credibility: Fiscal Councils on the 
Rise – A New Dataset’ (IMF Working Paper WP 14/58, International Monetary Fund, April 2014), 9. 
6 International Monetary Fund, ‘Fiscal Councils Data Set’, IMF Website, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/council/ (statistics as of end of December 2016).  
7 Von Trapp et al, 10.  
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following reforms in the fiscal framework,8 part of ‘the massive reform agenda’ 
undertaken by the EU in respect of its financial markets supervision and regulatory 
structures.9 Outside the EU, new IFIs have been set up – as in Canada (2008) and 
Australia (2011) – to increase fiscal transparency and enhance the role of the 
legislature in the budget process.  
 
RATIONALE 1: DEFICIT BIAS  
 
Specific reasons for introducing an IFI vary according to national context, a 
point our case studies will illustrate. But two general (related but not subsumable) 
rationales tend to be advanced to explain the potential contribution of the IFI from 
a political economy standpoint. One prominent rationale offers the IFI as a 
technology for certain ‘credible commitment’ problems that pertain in this area, 
specifically the tendency of governments to depart from the long-term interests of 
the populace in fiscal sustainability for short-term gain, electoral popularity, or 
sectional interest. The argument connects the IFI to the persistence in advanced 
economies of deficits across the economic cycle. Robert Hagemann notes that this 
is a long-term trend: ‘the overall fiscal balance of OECD economies, as well as in 
the large majority of its member countries, was in deficit throughout virtually the 
entire three decades to 2007’.10 This is a problem in as much as one subscribes to 
the macro-economic theory that government should run a counter-cyclical fiscal 
policy (i.e. deficits in a recession and surpluses in boom times so that public debt is 
kept stable across the economic cycle).11 Yet the persistence of deficits indicates a 
different practice – ‘a tendency to adopt and implement pro-cyclical positions 
during cyclical upswings, resulting in high levels of public debt.’12  
On this rationale, the problem the IFI responds to is a predisposition to favour 
tax and spend policies that produce deficits at all times within the economic cycle 
                                                      
8 According to the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance 2012 (TSCG), euro area member 
states must have an independent body to monitor compliance with national fiscal rules. For analysis of 
the TSCG see Paul P. Craig, ‘The Stability, Coordination and Governance Treaty: Principle, Politics and 
Pragmatism’ (2012) 37 European Law Review 231. The requirement to have IFIs was subsequently 
enhanced by the so-called ‘two-pack’ set of EU Regulations: EU Regulation 472/2013 on the 
strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of euro area members states experiencing or 
threatened with serious difficulties with respect to financial stability (EU Budget Surveillance Regulation); 
and EU Regulation 473/2013, which set out a common budgetary timeline applying to all euro area states 
for the publication and adoption of national medium-term fiscal plans and draft budgets. As part of this 
process, all euro area states were required to establish IFIs by October 2013 (EU Budget Monitoring and 
Assessing Regulation). For analysis see Sergio De la Parra, ‘The Two Pack on Economic Governance: An 
Initial Analysis’ (Background Analysis, European Trade Institute, Brussels 2013).  
9 Niamh Moloney, ‘Reform or Revolution? The Financial Crisis, EU Financial Markets Law, and the 
European Securities and Markets Authority’ (2011) 60 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 521, 523. 
10 Robert Hagemann, ‘How Can Fiscal Councils Strengthen Fiscal Performance?’ (2011) 1 OECD Journal: 
Economic Studies 75, 77. 
11 As one might expect, this model is contested. For an entry into the debate see James M. Buchanan and 
Richard A. Musgrave, Public Finance and Public Choice: Two Contrasting Visions of the State (Cambridge, Mass: 
MIT Press, 1999).  
12 Hagemann, 77. 
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arising from the tendency among elected politicians ‘not to consolidate the budget 
during good times in order not to hurt their electorates’.13 The intuition is that 
politicians, perceiving the importance of economic conditions for electoral success, 
will generate a ‘political business cycle’ so as to foster favourable conditions at 
election time.14 It represents as such an example of the principal-agent problem that 
looms large in the public finance literature.15  The term ‘deficit bias’ often deployed 
in such analyses trades on the idea of ‘inflation bias’ used in the monetary policy 
context which postulates that governments are unlikely to stick to long-term 
inflation targets due to time inconsistency pressures (the notion that policy makers’ 
short-term objectives, such as adjusting interest rates in response to rising 
unemployment, conflict with the long-term objective of price stability,16 a problem 
said to be amplified in democracies17). Some economists argued that monetary 
policy functions– including the decision and execution of that policy, not just advice 
– should be outsourced to independent central banks,18 a proposal that had 
significant take-up in practice.19 By analogy,20 some argue that IFIs can address 
some of the presumed causes of deficit bias, including information asymmetry (both 
between voters and politicians and between the legislature and the executive), 
economic forecasting bias (the tendency among governments to over-optimism in 
their economic forecasts21) and time inconsistency (as defined above).22  
                                                      
13 Jurgen von Hagen, ‘Scope and Limits of Independent Fiscal Institutions’ in George Kopits (ed.), 
Restoring Public Debt Sustainability: The Role of Independent Fiscal Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013), 38. This relates to the practice of ‘deficit finance’: expenditure is raised in a context where 
additional outlays are deficit-financed (rather than through raising taxes). On this scenario, the principal 
of today in effect colludes with its agent to put the cost burden on the principal of tomorrow.  
14 Richard A. Musgrave and Peggy B. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 5th ed., 1989), 105.  
15 For an application of the insights of public finance theory into the domain of constitutions and 
constitutional arrangements see Jean-Jacques Laffont, Incentives and Political Economy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000).  
16 Charles Wyplosz, ‘Fiscal Policy: Institutions versus Rules’ (2005) 191 National Institute Economic Review 
64, 67: ‘the long-term discipline objective is systematically overlooked when short term discretion is being 
used’. But see Wren-Lewis, ‘Comparing the Delegation of Monetary and Fiscal Policy’, 58-62 and Xavier 
Debrun, ‘Democratic Accountability, Deficit Bias and Independent Fiscal Agencies’ (IMF Working Paper 
WP/11/173, International Monetary Fund, 2011) 10, both rejecting the claim that the specific type of 
time inconsistency that applies to inflation bias also applies to deficit bias.  
17 Paul Tucker, Unelected Power: The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2018), 130: ‘elected politicians face a bit of a problem in committing to a 
stable and prudent debt management strategy because their expected life in office is so much shorter than 
the life of the debt’. 
18 See e.g. Charles Goodhart, The Evolution of Central Banks (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988); Tucker, 
Unelected Power. 
19 See e.g. Christopher Crowe and Ellen E. Meade, ‘The Evolution of Central Bank Governance around 
the World’ (2007) 21 Journal of Economic Perspectives 69. 
20 See e.g. Simon Wren-Lewis, ‘Comparing the Delegation of Monetary and Fiscal Policy’ in Koptis, 
Restoring Public Debt Sustainability.  
21 Lars Calmfors and Simon Wren-Lewis, ‘What Should Fiscal Councils Do?’ (2011) 26 Economic Policy 
651. 
22 Other problems associated with deficit bias include government impatience – governments know their 
time in power is limited and are therefore unlikely properly to internalise the long-term implications of 
fiscal decisions – and the ‘common pool’ problem – that those who press governments for increased 
spending, or greater tax cuts, fail to internalise the overall costs of higher spending and debt. See Paul 
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RATIONALE 2: INFORMATION ASYMMETRY 
 
If the first rationale sees the IFI as a technocratic tool that can mitigate deficit 
bias through a strategy of de-politicisation, the second rationale understands the office 
in terms of an institutional response to the decline of legislative influence in the 
budget process, and is as such arguably a strategy of re-politicisation. Its starting point 
is the observation that the executive now typically controls the budget process. This 
new executive financial hegemony has implications for the democratic ideal of 
elected legislators checking and controlling government tax and spending policies. 
From this perspective, the primary goal of the IFI is to enhance the fiscal capabilities 
of the legislature.   
Articulating this rationale, Allen Schick offers a long-term narrative according 
to which legislatures initially wrested control over executive (usually the monarch’s) 
spending through appropriations legislation until the expansion of government 
altered the balance of financial power. The result was that budgeting came to be 
viewed as a core function of the executive (aided by its growing bureaucratic 
apparatus).23 Joachim Wehner subjects the constitutional notion that legislatures 
control the power of the purse to rigorous comparative quantitative and qualitative 
examination and concludes that, with the exception of the United States, legislatures 
within the OECD often have a low ability to scrutinise, influence and shape 
budgets.24  
Observations of this sort have led to calls for a redefined role for legislatures 
in tackling debt and deficit, ideally in a manner that is not hostile to the service 
delivery demands of citizens. Schick calls for a strengthened legislature capable of 
‘promoting fiscal discipline, improving allocation of public money, and stimulating 
administrative entities to manage their operations more efficiently.’25 These insights 
often cash out in terms of the need to provide non-partisan analysis to legislators in 
order to ‘break the executive’s monopoly on budget information’.26 The IFI can be 
modelled as an institution that can help legislators by simplifying complex executive 
                                                      
Posner and Matthew Sommerfield, ‘The Politics of Fiscal Austerity: Democracies and Hard Choices’ 
(2013) 13 OECD Journal on Budgeting 141.  
23 Allen Schick, ‘Can National Legislatures Regain an Effective Voice in Budgetary Policy?’ (2002) 1 
OECD Journal on Budgeting 15. For the ‘long history’ of this topic see Carolyn Webber and Aaron 
Wildavsky, A History of Taxation and Expenditure in the Western World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1986) and, specifically from the perspective of British constitutional history, Paul Einzig, The Control of the 
Purse: Progress and Decline of Parliament’s Financial Control (London: Secker & Warburg, 1959).  
24 Joachim Wehner, Legislatures and the Budget Process – The Myth of Fiscal Control (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010). The UK Parliament performs particularly poorly in this comparative examination.   
25 Schick, ‘Can National Legislatures Regain an Effective Voice in Budgetary Policy?’, 28. 
26 John K. Johnson and Rick Stapenhurst, ‘Legislative Budget Offices: International Experience’ in Rick 
Stapenhurst, Riccardo Pelizzo, David M. Olsen, Lisa von Trapp (eds), Legislative Oversight and Budgeting: A 
World Perspective (Washington DC: World Bank, 2008), 152. 
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proposals, thereby enhancing the credibility of forecasts (through greater 
contestability) and promoting fiscal transparency and accountability.27  
More specifically, some argue that the IFI can reduce two types of information 
asymmetry. First, principal-agent information asymmetry can be improved.28 By 
opening up the budgeting process, the IFI can create a more capable principal (the 
citizens) who, better informed by the expert and independent bystander, is able to 
use their voting power to reward good policy or sanction bad policy on the part of 
its agent (the government). Second, legislature-executive information asymmetry: 
the problem being that the executive has enormous resources (including expert 
resources) at its disposal, while the legislature typically does not. One way of 
responding to this problem is to provide a greater range of independent fiscal 
information either by providing a legislative-aligned IFI or by means of an official 
forecaster independent of the executive.29  
 
DESIGN VARIATION  
 
While it is legitimate to talk about the IFI in the singular, it is important to 
acknowledge considerable flexibility in design. IFIs form a ‘heterogenous group’, as 
one might expect, that ‘vary considerably in terms of their governance provisions, 
breadth of their mandate and functions, leadership and staff arrangements, and 
budget.’30 Path-dependency is a strong factor, as it almost always is in the context 
of agency design where local needs and the local institutional environment remain 
paramount. For member states within the Euro area, initiatives take place within the 
relatively specific terms of EU regulatory structure developed under the TSCG.31 
Elsewhere, design choices – as well as being influenced by more mundane political 
factors – often come down to which of the rationale(s) for the IFI attracted more 
institutional support at the time of conception.  
Von Trapp et al identify three basic models of IFI: the fiscal council, which tend 
either to be small councils comprised mainly of academics (e.g. Sweden, Ireland) or 
follow a corporatist tradition in that members of a larger council are proposed by 
different stakeholders (e.g. Austria, Denmark); the parliamentary budget office, where 
the focus is on assisting parliamentary oversight of the budget and supporting the 
                                                      
27 Barry Anderson, ‘The Value of a Nonpartisan, Independent, Objective Analytical Unit to the 
Legislative Role in Budget Preparation’ in Stapenhurst et al, Legislative Oversight and Budgeting. 
28 See e.g. Debrun, ‘Democratic Accountability, Deficit Bias and Independent Fiscal Agencies’. 
29 For a good discussion and summary of the literature see Hagemann, ‘How Can Fiscal Councils 
Strengthen Fiscal Performance?’. See also George Kopits, ‘Independent Fiscal Institutions: Developing 
Good Practices’ (2011) 11 OECD Journal on Budgeting 3. 
30 See von Trapp et al, ‘Principles for Independent Fiscal Institutions and Case Studies’, 13.  
31 Although even here, considerable variation is to be found. Compare e.g. the French High Council for 
Public Finances (HCFP), closely networked with the existing Court of Auditors, and which has a direct (if 
non-binding) role in the budget process but no role in assessing the status and outlook – or sustainability 
of public finances, with the Spanish Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility (AIReF), which 
enjoys a broad mandate to ensure effective compliance by all public administrations with the budgetary 
stability principle established by Article 135 of the Spanish Constitution. This includes the continuous 
role of the budgetary cycle and public indebtedness, as well as analysis of economic forecasts. See von 
Trapp et al, ‘Principles for Independent Fiscal Institutions and Case Studies’, 118-23 and 214-9. 
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work of the main budget committee (e.g. Canada, United States); and the audit model, 
in which the IFI is an autonomous part of the national audit institution (Finland, 
France).32  
What is common to these models is that the institutions they model are not 
simply a functionary of the existing fiscal policy arm of the state (the Treasury or 
Finance Ministry). In design terms, they represent various (path-dependent) 
attempts to establish an entity with fiscal responsibilities that inputs into 
government at the highest level but remains free from direct political control or 
interference. IFIs are structured so as to incline voters and decision makers of today 
to give more weight than they otherwise might to the impact their vote or decision 
will have on the fiscal situation future generations are likely to encounter.   
 
 
III. UNITED KINGDOM: THE OFFICE FOR BUDGET 
RESPONSIBILITY 
 
The genesis of the OBR in many ways reflects the overall story of the rise of the 
IFI. Established after the GFC in response to local political concerns, the OBR was 
designed to address structural problems with the existing framework for maintaining 
fiscal discipline and prevent unsustainable public debt. The OBR also has some 
unique design features, notably its responsibility for supplying official fiscal and 
economic forecasts.  
 
ORIGINS 
 
The OBR grew out of a critical account of the fiscal performance of the 
previous (Labour) government pre- and post-GFC. The Conservative Party argued 
in the lead up to the 2010 general election that previous Treasury economic and 
fiscal forecasting had been too optimistic,33 an argument supported by the Institute 
for Fiscal Studies (IFS).34 The central claim was that the Labour government, 
assisted by this supposed forecasting bias, had overspent in the boom years, leaving 
state finances less well prepared when the crisis arrived and causing higher public 
debt as a result.35 Existing fiscal rules established by the Treasury as self-binding 
mechanisms against such a scenario, which were in any case suspended in late 2008 
as the GFC started to bite, were now seen as insufficient.36 Given this narrative, the 
                                                      
32 von Trapp et al, ‘Principles for Independent Fiscal Institutions and Case Studies’, 13.  
33 Conservative Party, ‘Reconstruction: Plan for a Strong Economy’ (Conservative Party, London, 2008). 
34 See e.g. Institute for Fiscal Studies, ‘The IFS Green Budget, January 2008’ (Institute for Fiscal Studies, 
London, 2008). The IFS is a politically non-aligned economic research institute that specialises in UK 
taxation and public policy.  
35 See e.g. Robert Chote and Simon Wren-Lewis, ‘United Kingdom: Fiscal Watchdog and Official 
Forecaster’ in Kopits, Restoring Public Debt Sustainability, 235. 
36 The Labour-led governments of 1997-2010 committed itself to two main fiscal rules: the golden rule that 
‘over the economic cycle, the Government will borrow only to invest and not to fund current spending’ 
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creation of an arms-length body embedded within the interstices of fiscal 
administration but distinguished by its sole interest in fiscal responsibility must have 
seemed a natural progression.  
 
LEGAL STATUS AND FUNCTIONS 
 
The OBR was established (initially on an interim basis37) on the formation of 
the Conservative-led Coalition Government in 2010,38 with the primary ‘objective 
of removing any possibility of political interference from official forecasts’.39 Taking 
up its forecasting functions, the OBR became the first IFI anywhere to be charged 
with making official fiscal and economic forecasts. The Budget Responsibility and 
National Audit Act 2011 (Budget Responsibility Act) put the OBR on a permanent 
footing, with former IFS Director and economic journalist Robert Chote as chair.40 
The OBR is an executive non-departmental public body or executive agency. 
It is primarily responsible to government not Parliament, but is an independent, 
arms-length entity. As its sponsor department is the Treasury, it is the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer who accounts for the OBR’s business in Parliament. The Chancellor 
also appoints the chair and the two other members of the Budget Responsibility 
Committee, the unit that heads the OBR.41 An Oversight Board, comprising the 
three members of the BRC plus two non-executive members,42 and an Advisory 
Panel of economic and fiscal experts (mostly academics and financial practitioners) 
complete the corporate structure.  
The House of Commons Treasury Select Committee (Treasury Committee) 
must approve those appointments43 and more generally has oversight over the 
OBR. For a select committee to have a veto power over appointments and 
                                                      
and the sustainable investment rule that ‘over the economic cycle, the ratio of net public sector debt to GDP 
will be set at a stable and prudent level’ (defined by the Treasury as no more than 40% of GDP): Finance 
Act 1998, Part VI; UK Government, ‘Code of Fiscal Stability: Budget 1998’ (March 1998). The 
framework was largely retrospective and the Government could also gain fiscal leeway through its 
determination on the dates on which the economic cycle started and finished. Pre-2010 arrangements did 
not, then, address the potential ‘time inconsistency’ problem noted in our conceptual introduction. For 
analysis see Carl Emmerson, Chris Fayne and Sarah Love, ‘The Government’s Fiscal Rules’ (Institute of 
Fiscal Studies Briefing Note No.16, November 2006).  
37 HM Treasury Press Notice, ‘Chancellor announces policy on fiscal credibility’, 17 May 2010.  
38 For its place within the Coalition agreement see Paul Johnson and Daniel Chandler, ‘The Coalition and 
the Economy’ in Anthony Seldon and Mike Finn (eds), The Coalition Effect, 2010-2015 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015).  
39 Sir Alan Budd, ‘Letter to the Chancellor: Advice on the Establishment of OBR as a Permanent Body’, 
12 July 2010, para 7. 
40 Chote remains chair at the time of writing, having been reappointed for another 5-year term in 
September 2015. 
41 At the time of writing, the other two members of the BRC are former Deputy Governor for Monetary 
Policy at the Bank of England Professor Sir Charlie Bean and Graham Parker CBE, who had worked 
previously at the Treasury, the Inland Revenue and the IMF. The latter steps down in August 2018, to be 
replaced by Andy King, civil servant and currently Chief of Staff at the OBR. 
42 Currently Christopher Kelly (career civil servant) and Bronwyn Curtis (global financial economist and 
consultant).  
43 Budget Responsibility Act, Schedule 1, s.1. 
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dismissals is extremely rare in the UK context,44 and gives the Treasury Committee 
more leverage in its dealings with government in relation to the OBR.45 The OBR 
is supported by a staff of 27 permanent civil servants, which makes the body 
relatively small both within the IFI context and compared to other domestic 
institutions – the Office for National Statistics, for instance, has a staff of over 3000 
staff. While there are efficiency arguments for making the body no bigger than 
necessary, it may impact on perceptions of independence, as we shall see.  
The fact that the OBR is accountable to both Government and Parliament has 
perplexed some commentators (we think without good reason). The first external 
review,46 conducted in 2014 by former Canadian Parliamentary Budget Officer 
Kevin Page, found that ‘the OBR’s legally defined sources of accountability (the 
Chancellor and Parliament) are in tension, challenging its independence’.47 But this 
double-headed accountability is not at all unusual within the UK agency context, 
where agencies tend to work for government but within a set of accountability 
conventions structured around the principle of Parliamentary democracy. It 
nonetheless serves to highlight the dual nature of the OBR as an institution of 
government that aspires to be both a service provider and an accountability 
mechanism.  
The 2011 Act mandates the OBR ‘to examine and report on the sustainability 
of the public finances’.48 In fulfilling this duty the OBR must (1) produce the official 
five-year economic and fiscal forecasts twice a year49; (2) assess the government’s 
progress in achieving its fiscal targets alongside its forecasts; (3) assess the accuracy 
of its previous forecasts;50 and (4) analyse the long-term sustainability of the public 
                                                      
44 Indeed, it was the Treasury Committee itself, in a 2010 Report, that suggested this innovative veto 
mechanism over BRC appointments and dismissals, thereby exerting a critical influence over the OBR’s 
design: House of Commons Treasury Committee, ‘Fourth Report of Session 2010-11 Volume I – Office 
for Budget Responsibility’ (21 September 2010), p.3.  
45 The Treasury Committee has not been shy in exerting its influence to ensure non-interference with the 
OBR’s functions. See e.g. ‘Treasury Select Committee raises red flags after emails reveal Treasury 
meddling with Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR)’, City AM, 22 February 2016.  
46 An external review of the OBR must be undertaken at least once every 5-year period: Budget 
Responsibility Act, Schedule 1, s.16. 
47 Kevin Page, ‘External Review of the Office for Budget Responsibility’ (September 2014), 34. 
Recommendation 4 of that Review noted that ‘the particularly narrow legal framework of the OBR and 
its interdependencies with the executive branch may risk creating perceptions of conflicts-of-interest’. 
48 Budget Responsibility Act, s.4(1). The Act also requires the Government to produce a Charter of 
Budget Responsibility (s.1), a Treasury document laid before the House of Commons and brought into 
force by a resolution of the Commons, which sets out the Government’s approach to fiscal policy, 
management of the National Debt, and guidance to the OBR about how it should perform its legislative 
duties. This and other documents are supplemented with a number of other primary governance 
documents, including a Memorandum of Understanding between the OBR and the Treasury (and HM 
Revenue and Customs, the Department for Work and Pensions) on the joint governance, management 
and development of the macroeconomic model used by both the OBR and Treasury in forecasting.  
49 These forecasts are published in the OBR’s Economic and Fiscal Outlook (EFO) publication. Its 
spring EFO is published at the same time as the budget and incorporates the impact of any tax and 
spending policy measures announced in the budget.  
50 The Treasury Review of the OBR recommended that the OBR should work systematically with 
forecasting departments on model development, building on existing practice to ensure key models are fit 
for practice.   
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finances, based on 50-year projections.51 The OBR can also undertake analysis on 
its own initiative. While its focus is on the public finances at a UK-wide level, the 
UK government also asks the OBR to forecast the receipts from taxes it has 
devolved, or intends to devolve, to the Scottish and Welsh governments.  
This set of functions indicates that the OBR tacks towards the first rationale 
outlined in the previous section. It aims to tackle ‘deficit bias’, specifically by 
targeting economic forecasting bias (the tendency among governments to over-
optimism in their economic forecasting) by the simple expediency of taking that 
responsibility from the hands of Government altogether.52  
The other critical task at Budget time for the OBR, beyond forecasting, is 
certifying the Government’s costings. The principal legal restriction on the OBR is 
the prohibition on alternative policy analysis. (At his Treasury Committee pre-
appointment hearing, Chote argued that OBR independence would be better served 
by allowing it to respond to costings requests from other political parties.53) While 
the Budget Responsibility Act prescribes that where ‘any Government policies are 
relevant to the performance’ of its duties, the OBR must have regard to those 
Government policies only, it notes specifically that the OBR ‘may not consider what 
the effect of any alternative policies would be.’54 This is a subtle provision, but marks 
an important difference between the OBR and some other IFIs, including the PBO 
as we shall see. This restriction on the OBR can be explained in part by the political 
controversy surrounding the Government’s austerity programme, instigated at the 
same time as the OBR was formed. Had the OBR been able to analyse not just that 
programme ‘but also the more gradual tightening proposed by the opposition, it 
would have been at the centre of political debate’ and may well as a result ‘have lost 
the appearance of impartiality’.55 
The prohibition on alternative policy costing precludes the OBR from 
producing election policy costings, which is a major function of the PBO. There is 
an ongoing debate about whether the OBR’s remit should be expanded to include 
the certification of costings of political parties’ tax and spending policies in the run-
up to general elections. The OBR itself (perhaps unsurprisingly) seems keen to 
expand its remit in this direction, believing that independent scrutiny of pre-election 
policy proposals could contribute to better policy making, a more informed public 
debate, and facilitate coalition-formation when party programmes need to be 
reconciled.56 A 2015 Treasury review of the OBR concluded that ‘the costs of 
relaxing the restricting on alternative policies are likely to outweigh the benefits at 
this stage, and by potentially undermining the OBR, it may serve to reduce rather 
                                                      
51 Budget Responsibility Act, s.4.  
52 There is a point of possible convergence between the UK and Australia, since it is now Labour Party 
policy for the PBO to be granted an official forecasting role in addition to its existing functions.  
53 ‘Robert Chote tells MPs: open OBR to all parties’, The Telegraph, 17 September 2010. 
54 Budget Responsibility Act, s.5(3), emphasis added.  
55 Chote and Wren-Lewis, ‘United Kingdom: Fiscal Watchdog and Official Forecaster’, 243. 
56 See Letter from Robert Chote (Chair of the OBR) to Andrew Tyrie (Chair of the Treasury Committee), 
‘The costing of pre-election policy proposals’, 15 January 2014.  
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than increase fiscal credibility in the UK.’57 Responding to this review, the Treasury 
Committee accentuated the positive aspects of the proposal, while ultimately leaving 
the matter an open question for further consideration. ‘The benefits to fiscal 
credibility of the OBR carrying out party policy costings before general elections are 
now becoming clear’, it said, and cited with approval the Institute for Government’s 
balanced argument in favour of the move.58 
The legal structure of the OBR contains a number of mechanisms aimed at 
shoring up the OBR’s independence and impartiality. The primary legislation 
stipulates that the OBR ‘has complete discretion’ in performing its main forecasting 
duty but ‘must perform that duty objectively, transparently and impartially.’59 The 
Charter of Budget Responsibility, which sets out the OBR’s remit, contains a 
number of independence-related provisions. These relate to forecasting methods, 
content of publications, work programme and own-initiative research. The Budget 
Responsibility Act provides a right of access ‘to all Government information which 
it may reasonably require for the purposes of the performance of its [main] duty’.60 
The Framework Document, a more detailed governance and management 
specification, states that the OBR’s duty to work ‘objectively, transparently and on 
the basis of government policy’ fundamentally ‘protects the independence of the 
OBR and ensures a clear separation between analysis (which is the role of the OBR) 
and policy-making (which is the responsibility of ministers).’61  
The absence of a guarantee in respect of the OBR’s budget in the framing 
legislation (or the Charter) is sub-optimal from the perspective of securing an IFI’s 
autonomy, as the Page Review noted.62 A five-year funding allocation from the 
Treasury was agreed in 2016-17.63 This reduces the possibility of politically 
motivated budget fiddling. BRC members are restricted from engaging in 
‘controversial political activity’ as part of their terms of employment. 
But the OBR’s reasonably robust legal and corporate structure (input 
legitimacy)64 is complicated by aspects of its working life (output legitimacy). The 
objective of holding government to account may be tempered by the reality that in 
                                                      
57 HM Treasury, ‘HM Treasury review of the Office for Budget Responsibility’, 3 September 2015, para 
3.92. 
58 House of Commons Treasury Committee, ‘Reviewing the Office for Budget Responsibility’ (Seventh 
Report of Session 2015-16, 9 February 2016), paras 45, 50 & 54.  
59 Budget Responsibility Act, s.5. 
60 Budget Responsibility Act s.9(1). 
61 HM Treasury, ‘Office of Budget Responsibility and HM Treasury Framework Document’ (May 2014), 
at 1.7. 
62 ‘External Review’, p.32.  
63 Letter from the Treasury Permanent Secretary to OBR Chair (31 March 2016). 
64 As Gillian Metzger notes, calibrating agency independence can be a complicated affair in which many 
variables are in play ‘including budgetary autonomy, bipartisan and multimember composition, and the 
extent of substantive oversight in addition to removal protection’: ‘Through the Looking Glass to a 
Shared Reflection’, 134. We might also note that independence is only one variable when assessing an 
agency’s overall social value (e.g. its fit within a pre-existing administrative network; structures of 
accountability; constitutional principles). On the importance of ‘background conditions’ in agency design 
in the financial regulation context see Cristie Ford, ‘New Governance in the Teeth of Human Frailty: 
Lessons from Financial Regulation’ (2010) Wisconsin Law Review 441. 
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providing economic forecasting the OBR performs what has hitherto been seen as 
a basic function of modern government. The tension that ensues is captured in the 
last line of the Government response to the Treasury Committee 2010 Report: ‘The 
Government agrees that the OBR should not run education campaigns.’65 While it 
was never intended that the OBR run campaigns, the line is indicative of a view that 
while the OBR should publish ‘user-friendly’ reports, it ought not to go out of its 
way to educate the public. The stronger this sentiment, the more the OBR begins 
to resemble a mechanism internal to government rather than a tool to enhance 
democratic decision-making.  
The prevailing practice among existing IFIs was for an independent body 
which comments on government forecasts or produces its own forecasts. The OBR 
broke that mould in that it was set up to provide forecasts for the government. But 
that role means that the OBR inevitably operates close working relationships with 
various government departments, above all the Treasury. The OBR, with its small 
permanent staff, relies on extra staffing largely seconded from the Treasury during 
forecasting periods in particular.66 The sense of a revolving door between OBR and 
the Treasury has the potential to undermine perceptions of independence. The 
Treasury Committee in its 2016 Report homed in on the opportunity enjoyed by 
Ministers to offer views to the OBR during the pre-release access period of the 
Economic and Fiscal Outlook. If the OBR ‘is to remain demonstrably institutionally 
independent’, the Committee concluded, ‘the terms of engagement with 
Government departments must be clarified. At a minimum, a revised Memorandum 
of Understanding should explain the purpose of exceptional pre-release access, 
which Ministers and officials are granted access and why, and the sort of changes to 
OBR documents that are envisaged during this period.’67 
 
LINES OF DEVELOPMENT  
 
In its early years, the emphasis of the OBR appears to have been more on 
independent and impartial service delivery rather than on developing an expert and 
external ‘check’ on government. This is a familiar pattern for an early-career IFI. 
Chohan and Jacobs identify two basic functions such a body might perform. IFIs 
‘can be relegated to a perfunctory and mechanical role of costing policies that are 
brought to them’ by government or political parties (the mechanistic-costing role). 
Alternatively, IFIs can also provide ‘a more active engagement, a presentation of 
budget options, and sense of “right” policies in a variety of fields’ including 
government borrowing and expenditure (the normative-advisory role). The authors see 
the latter role as ‘more advanced, and more valuable, but also more politically 
                                                      
65 ‘Government Response to the House of Commons Treasury Committee 4th Report of Session 2010-
11: Office for Budget Responsibility’ (November 2010), at 5.20. 
66 For details see ‘HM Treasury review of the Office for Budget Responsibility’, paras 5.30-5.31. 
67 Treasury Committee, ‘Reviewing the Office for Budget Responsibility’, para 37.  
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contentious’.68 The OBR, as currently modelled, sits squarely within the former 
category.  
Despite its relatively limited remit, the OBR has not been free from 
controversy. We have already noted the Treasury Committee’s concern for the 
independence of the OBR from Government (especially the Treasury). That 
investigation was triggered by the revelation that the Government had used the pre-
release access period as an opportunity to induce not entirely insignificant changes 
of language from the Economic and Fiscal Outlook in late 2014. As well as the 
robust Treasury Committee Report, the incident also brought critical headlines.69 
The OBR has also received criticism for the quality of its economic forecasting. 
Generally, this has concerned its predictive capacities: in its early years (2010-12) its 
growth forecasts were over-optimistic; later on (2012-14) they proved to be more 
negative than the actual figures.70 More sophisticated criticism has targeted 
modelling blind-spots. Future spending on welfare and other benefits is calculated 
independently by the OBR by projecting forward the costs of current policies. For 
other Departmental spending, the OBR effectively uses the Chancellor’s numbers, 
regardless of whether they are compatible with the Government’s current detailed 
spending policies, undermining to some extent the robustness of the relevant OBR 
forecasts.71  
These sorts of criticisms go largely with the grain of the institution, in that they 
accept that the OBR can in principle produce ‘public value’ through exerting 
government numbers on present and future public expenditure to rigorous 
examination.72 It is not necessarily implausible to count them as symptoms of 
success. They show that the OBR has not been ignored – though perhaps given its 
official forecasting role it is not really ignorable, especially given economic 
conditions since 2010. If the OBR is to realise any of its aims, whether improving 
efficiency or raising the level of transparency and accountability in the budget 
process, then it really has to be in the public eye. The friction generated by at least 
some of these critical moments may facilitate productive reform of the institution. 
 
 
IV. AUSTRALIA: PARLIAMENTARY BUDGET OFFICE 
 
As noted in the introduction, there has been a notable increase in the number of 
IFIs since the GFC (especially within the Eurozone). But we also observed that the 
                                                      
68 Usman W. Chohan and Kerry Jacobs, ‘Public Value in Politics: A Legislative Budget Office Approach’ 
(2017) 40 International Journal of Public Administration 1063, 1064.  
69 See e.g. ‘Treasury has sought to meddle with OBR forecasts’, The Times, 14 September 2015.  
70 See e.g. ‘Four times the OBR has been wrong’, The Telegraph, 24 November 2016.  
71 Julian McCrae, ‘Securing the long-term credibility of the OBR: four key changes are needed’, Institute for 
Government, 30 November 2015.  
72 Chohan and Jacobs, ‘Public Value in Politics: A Legislative Budget Office Approach’. The underlying 
source of this approach is Mark Moore, Creating Public Value: Strategic Management in Government 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). 
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impetus underlying the creation of such institutions is both longer term and more 
general, aided in no small measure by international and transnational governmental 
institutions such as the G2073 and the IMF.74 Australia provides an interesting 
example in this context. Its Parliamentary Budget Office, while it dates from the 
relevant period – it commenced operations on 23 July 2012 – has almost nothing 
directly to do with the GFC, which left Australia largely unscathed. The immediate 
context for the genesis of the PBO was political deal making involving a Labour 
Prime Minister without a majority courting a supply agreement from independent 
parliamentarians. One of the things those MPs wanted, and which the Prime 
Minister was prepared to grant, was an interesting example of the parliamentary 
budget office model of IFI.  
The catalyst for the PBO may have arisen out of the need to form a working 
majority, but the primary impetus behind its creation was the perceived need (at 
least among some independent MPs) for greater fiscal transparency and 
accountability regarding the cost of election promises and more broadly costings 
outside of an election period requested by independents. One of the key issues was 
that while the government, opposition, and any minority party with at least 5 elected 
members enjoyed access to the Ministry of Finance and Treasury to cost their 
election commitments under the Charter of Budget Honesty Act, similar access was 
not available to smaller political parties or independents, an important feature of the 
modern Australian political landscape.75 A secondary impetus came from the view 
among some that Parliament would benefit from specialised and independent 
research and analysis on fiscal and economic policy.  
 
ORIGINS 
 
The 2010 general election resulted in a hung parliament. As part of the 
negotiation process between the Labour Party (ALP) and the cross-bench 
independents, a deal was struck between the then leader of the ALP, Julia Gillard, 
and two independent MPs, Rob Oakeshott and Tony Windsor, which agreed a set 
of reforms to the parliamentary process. Some of these reforms were for additional 
resources for Parliament. This agenda included reform 16.1: that a Parliamentary 
Budget Office ‘be established, based in the Parliament Library, to provide 
independent costings, fiscal analysis and research to all members of parliament, 
especially non-government members. The structure, resourcing and protocols for 
such an Office be the subject of a decision by a special committee of the Parliament 
                                                      
73 See e.g. Mathias Dolls, Andreas Peichl and Klaus F. Zimmermann, ‘A challenge for the G20: Global debt 
brakes and transnational fiscal supervisory councils’ (2012) 47 Intereconomics 31, discussing inter alia the steps 
taken on this front at G20 conferences in Seoul and Toronto in 2010 and Cannes in 2011.  
74 See e.g. IMF, Fiscal Councils: Rationale and Effectiveness (IMF Working Paper 16/86, International 
Monetary Fund, April 2016).  
75 Charter of Budget Honesty Act 1998 (Cth), Parts 2 & 8.. For a recent explanation of how this process 
operates, including interaction with the PBO, see Joint Secretaries of the Treasury and Department of 
Finance, Charter of Budget Honesty Policy Costing Guidelines, Treasury, 2016 
(https://static.treasury.gov.au/uploads/sites/1/2017/06/charter-of-budget-honesty-guidelines.pdf) 
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which is truly representative of the Parliament.’76 A Joint Select Committee on the 
Parliamentary Budget Office was appointed, reporting in March 2011. The 
Government agreed or agreed-in-principle to all of its 28 recommendations in July. 
The agreement included allocating $24.9 million over 4 years in the 2011-12 Budget 
to establish the PBO, 77 a provision which makes it one of the most effectively 
endowed budget institutions in the world.78  
Its functions and organisational arrangement indicate that, in contrast to the 
OBR, the PBO tacks towards the second rationale for IFIs outlined earlier. Its 
immediate goal is to address ‘information asymmetry’ associated with the politics of 
modern public financing, specifically by empowering both minority parties and 
independents within Parliament and Parliament more generally through the 
provision of specialised, independent fiscal information. This is not to say, of 
course, that countering the problem of ‘deficit bias’ (Rationale 1) is not present in 
these arrangements as an underlying goal.  
 
LEGAL STATUS AND FUNCTIONS 
 
The PBO was established by the Parliamentary Service Amendment 
(Parliamentary Budget Officer) Act 2011 (which amended a number of pieces of 
legislation, most notably the Parliamentary Service Act 1999) as one of four 
parliamentary departments supporting the Australian Parliament.79 Its primary 
clients are parliamentarians. Accountability to Parliament is secured in the first 
instance through the appointments process. The PB Officer is appointed (and can 
only be removed) for a four-year term by the Presiding Officers, i.e. the Speaker of 
the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate, following approval 
by the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit (‘the Committee’).80 The 
legislation also grants significant oversight powers to the Committee, which has a 
duty to consider the PBO’s annual work plans and budget.81 
Unlike the OBR whose primary functions concern forecasts and budget 
estimates, the PBO is specifically prohibited from preparing economic forecasts or 
preparing budget estimates, whether at the government, agency or programme 
level.82 Rather its mandate is ‘to inform the Parliament by providing … independent 
and non-partisan analysis of the budget cycle, fiscal policy and the financial 
                                                      
76 See the Australian Labour Party and the Independent members (Mr Tony Windsor and Mr Rob 
Oakeshott) – Agreement, 7 Sept. 2010, and ‘Appendix B: Agreement for a Better Parliament – 
Parliamentary Reform’ 
77 Government Response to the Joint Select Committee on the Parliamentary Budget Office Inquiry into 
the Proposed Parliamentary Budget Office, July 2011.  
78 Usman W. Chohan, ‘How does Australia’s policy costings body, the Parliamentary Budget Office, 
compare?’, The Conversation, June 2016.  
79 Parliamentary Service Act 1999 – as amended by the Parliamentary Service Amendment (Parliamentary 
Budget Officer) Act 2013 – s.64A. 
80 s.64X. 
81 s.64S. 
82 s.64E(2). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3203960 
 
Cal Viney and Thomas Poole               Independent Fiscal Institutions  
 
 
 17 
implications of proposals.’83 This translates into two more specific functions: (1) 
election policy costings; and (2) policy costings on request by senators and members.  
(1) The election policy costings function is a distinctive feature of the Australian 
version of the IFI. A survey of OECD countries found only one other jurisdiction 
– the Netherlands – where the IFI has a role in costing elections.84 This part of its 
mandate equates to two powers, the first being a power for parliamentarians to 
request that a policy be costed on a public basis during the ‘caretaker period’ leading 
up to polling day. The second is a mandatory reporting requirement, a responsibility 
introduced in 201385 which requires the PBO ‘to report on election commitments 
of designated Parliamentary parties’ within 30 days of the end of the caretaker period 
of a general election. The report must set out for each designated parliamentary 
party costings of (a) all election commitments that would have ‘a material impact on 
the Commonwealth budget sector and Commonwealth general government sector 
fiscal estimates’ and (b) ‘the total combined impact those election commitments 
would have on the Commonwealth budget sector and Commonwealth general 
government sector fiscal estimates’ over the next 4 financial years.  
In practice this entails that each party must, before 5pm on the day before 
polling day, give the PBO a list of the policies that the party has publicly announced 
it intends to seek to have implemented after the election. The ensuing report must 
be publicly released. This means that when parties announce a policy, with their own 
costing, they know that it will be subject to serious post-election scrutiny by an 
independent body. As then Treasurer Wayne Swan observed during the second 
reading of the 2013 legislation: ‘The Bill will impose discipline on the promises of 
political parties and incentivize all political parties to be up front and honest about 
the cost of their promises.’86 
The fact that the scrutiny of costings proposals occurs after polling day may 
look curious, causing a sceptic to wonder how the PBO can influence a vote if its 
work on election policies only comes out after the election. It is true that the 
arrangement represents a trade-off between, on one hand, the goal of encouraging 
fiscal responsibility in election promises and, on the other, the over-politicisation 
and the over-exposure that would ensue if the PBO could put out a statement 
shortly before election day confirming or dismissing the purported costs of a party’s 
election policies (cf Former FBI Director James Comey’s intervention in the 2016 
US Presidential election is a cautionary tale87). The PBO may still exert influence, 
casting a shadow over campaigning. That presence, more particularly the sanction 
                                                      
83 s.64B. 
84 von Trapp et al, ‘Principles for Independent Fiscal Institutions and Case Studies’, 19 & 181. Although 
established in 1945, the tradition has grown since the mid-1980s of requesting costing and economic 
impact forecasts of election manifestos from the CFB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. 
Although voluntary, all major parties now ask for such costings.  
85 By the Parliamentary Service Amendment (Parliamentary Budget Officer) Act 2013.  
86 Hansard, Thursday 14 March 2013, p. 2093. 
87 See for example, Amy Chozick ‘Hillary Clinton Blames F.B.I. Director for Election Loss’ in New York Times, 
12 November 2016,  https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/13/us/politics/hillary-clinton-james-
comey.html 
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of having the PBO issue a statement 30 days after a party is elected (or even after 
defeat) to the effect that its costings were seriously in error, provides a non-
negligible incentive to politicians not to make extravagant promises. Financial 
credibility is a hard-won reputation in the political arena, and easily lost, and a party’s 
reputation for fiscal competence – or incompetence – does not track a single 
electoral cycle but operates over the medium-to-long term. (Consider how the 
British Labour Party still suffers from a reputation for fiscal irresponsibility picked 
up a decade ago.)  
(2) The policy costings function involves a requirement on the PBO to prepare 
responses to requests from individual Senators and Members (and also 
parliamentary committees) outside the caretaker period, a power that notably 
includes the preparation of costings in relation to proposed policies and bills. This 
function might seem on the face of it to enable a party to ‘officially’ cost another 
party’s policy proposal or initiative. However, in practice this is unlikely. PBO 
Guidance Note 01/2013 provides that since the PBO must operate at all times in 
an independent and non-partisan manner, it ‘will not prepare costings of policies 
attributed to an individual parliamentarian or a political party without the knowledge 
and active participation of the individual parliamentarian or political party in the 
costings process.’88  
The PBO’s fundamental role in relation to this part of its remit, then, is to 
empower members of opposition parties, and more specifically minor parties, to 
cost their own policies. Both the guidance notes and the practice of the PBO as 
evidenced by its website, which publishes all costings unless requested to be kept 
confidential, indicates that the key to the PBO’s work is power asymmetry between 
Government (which has the Treasury to hand) and minor parties and independents, 
especially in the Senate. Much of the costing work concerns proposals that 
independents or small party Senators put to the PBO often in the context of 
negotiations with Government on amendments to legislation that they would like 
to see. The fact that such a request (outside the caretaker period) may be confidential 
enables parliamentarians and parliamentary parties to develop and cost their policies 
in a measured fashion in the lead up to an election. They are then able to publicly 
release policies that have been professionally costed by the PBO.  
Again, details of these arrangements may appear counter-intuitive. In 
particular, if the rationale behind the PBO is to counteract information asymmetry, 
the option to keep costings confidential seems odd. That criticism would be more 
compelling if the PBO was designed to address information between the public and 
the executive (principal-agent asymmetry). While this is one of the roles of the PBO 
– possibly an increasing one – it remains a subsidiary function. Its primary objective 
is to overcome information asymmetry (and resource asymmetry) between MPs 
who are not members of a major party, and the elected government (legislature-
                                                      
88 PBO Guidance Note 01/2013, ‘Costing of policy proposals at the request of a parliamentarian or 
political party that are attributed to another parliamentarian or political party’. 
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executive information asymmetry). The possibility of confidential costings does 
nothing to address public/government information asymmetries but may be part of 
an effective response to legislature/executive asymmetries. The central innovation 
is that MPs can now get their hands on genuine costings, when previously this would 
not have been a realistic prospect.  
The PBO’s mandate does not extend to oversight of the budget process, 
although it does include the duty to prepare responses to requests by Senators or 
Members to the budget. It also has a fairly broad capacity to conduct on its own 
initiative research on and analysis of the budget and fiscal policy settings.89 Exercise 
of this own-motion power has produced 14 Reports to date, for instance on the 
budgetary impact of the National Broadband Network90 and the Higher Education 
Loan Programme.91 The impression is of an IFI that is busy doing independent 
policy thinking and forecasting.  
Two own-initiative reports on economic forecasting within the budget process 
are particularly salient.92 Although based on the economic forecasts and other 
parameters underpinning the Budget, analysis in these reports goes beyond the 
forward estimates contained in the official budget papers prepared by the Treasury 
(in the more recent report, to the years 2027-28). These ‘medium-term’ reports are 
not dissimilar to the ‘financial sustainability’ reports produced on an annual basis by 
the OBR.  
In the course of its ordinary business, the PBO is under an obligation to use 
the budget parameters set out by the Treasury, which are considerably shorter than 
the 50-year horizon deployed by the OBR. Even so, the PBO can be said to have 
made a concerted effort to insert a level of comparative rigour into the forecasting 
exercise. It is here that we can see perhaps most clearly the ambition of the PBO to 
become more than an election policy costing machine, reactive to the wishes of 
often marginal MPs and Senators. The PBO appears to be engaged, in the exercise 
of its own private-motion power, in a much broader analysis. It has chosen to 
examine some of the largest and most contentious areas of policy,93 and has done 
so while projecting their impacts over the forward estimates and undertaking 
forecasting work over a longer horizon than the Treasury.  
 
 
 
                                                      
89 s.64E(1)(c). 
90 Report 4/2016: National Broadband Network: Impact on the Budget (14 December 2016).  
91 Report 2/2016: Higher Education Loan Programme: Impact on the Budget (6 April 2016).  
92 Report 02/2015: 2015/16 Budget: Medium-term projections and Report 02/2017: 2017/18 Budget: 
medium-term projections (5 July 2017).  
93 The national broadband network has been one of the most expensive and controversial projects in 
recent Australian policy making history. See e.g. Tooran Alizadeh, ‘The NBN: how a national 
infrastructure dream fell short’ The Conversation, 5 June 2017; Paddy Manning, ‘Network Error’, The 
Monthly, April 2017; Karen Middleton, ‘The Politics of the NBN’, The Saturday Paper, 28 October 2017. 
Likewise the Higher Education Loan Programme remains a fundamental battle ground between major 
parties. For a brief history, and the role of the PBO within it, see Julie Hare and Kylar Loussikian, 
‘Higher education, higher costs in student loan scheme nightmare’ The Australian, 8 April 2016.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3203960 
 
                  12/2018 
 
 
  24 
LINES OF DEVELOPMENT 
 
While a relatively new entity on the Australian landscape, the PBO has become 
a creature of some interest. Two examples demonstrate its increasingly embedded 
nature. First, in the lead up to the 2016 national election, the Labour Party (by that 
time in opposition) announced an intention to expand the PBO’s remit, specifically 
by transferring the official forecasting role for the budget from the Treasury to the 
PBO. As Shadow Treasurer Chris Bowen noted, this innovation would ‘ensure that 
economic forecasts are undertaken at arm’s length from government, giving the 
public more confidence in the budget process’.94 Party political considerations 
naturally played a part in this proposal. Even so, it indicates a deepening 
commitment to the OBR within the political elite and more particularly an intention 
to give the institution more responsibility for mainstream fiscal management 
functions. The effect of such reform would be to bring the PBO closer to the OBR, 
by adding to its existing rationale of combatting ‘information asymmetry’ the 
additional rationale of tackling ‘deficit bias’.  
In politics as in life, imitation is often the sincerest form of flattery. As a 
federation, Australia offers plenty of scope for copycat innovation, and there has 
been a significant uptake of IFIs within state legislatures since the PBO was formed. 
In late 2010 – after the federal election that led to the establishment of the PBO – 
New South Wales introduced a Parliamentary Budget Officer. Like its federal 
counterpart, its focus is on election policy costings, with a statutory duration of less 
than a year before state elections.95 In South Australia, the Parliamentary Budget 
Advisory Service – led by the Parliamentary Budget Officer – operated for the first 
time at the 2018 state election, although at the time of writing it has no firm statutory 
underpinning.96 The focus of that model is once again non-compulsory election 
policy costings. Another institution similar in design to the federal PBO has recently 
been instituted in Victoria.97  
Entities with a special focus on costings used during the election process are 
proliferating in Australia. It is reasonable to wonder if the present (and rather 
                                                      
94 Chris Bowen, National Press Club Address, May 2016, quoted in Michelle Grattan, ‘Aspiring treasurer 
Chris Bowen looks fit for purpose’ The Conversation, 10 May 2016, https://theconversation.com/aspiring-
treasurer-chris-bowen-looks-fit-for-purpose-59187.  
95 See Parliamentary Budget Officer Act 2010; see also 
https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/pbo/Pages/Parliamentary-Budget-Office.aspx 
96 See http://pbas.sa.gov.au/about 
97 Parliamentary Budget Officer Act 2017. The Victorian scheme allows for election related policy 
costings and will operate at three levels: in the election policy costing period, a parliamentary leader may 
request the PBO officer prepare a policy costing (which can then be made public by the leader); if the 
leader asks for more than one policy to be costed in this period, they may instead request a ‘pre-election 
report’ enabling a party to list, and then have costed, those policies they would like costed, with the pre-
election report going public only at the request of the leader; there is a separate post-election report, 
under which the PBO Officer must prepare a post-election report on the policies of each parliamentary 
leader that were publicly announced before the date of the general election. The second plane of this 
body enables any MP to request a costing of a policy or proposed policy at any time during the 
parliamentary term. 
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narrow) focus on election policy costings will persist, or whether their role might 
expand, influenced by the possible direction of travel of the federal PBO, to include 
more general fiscal policy advisory functions. Recalling Chohan and Jacob’s 
framework, one possible direction of travel would be from the current staunchly 
mechanistic-costing role towards a more ambitious normative-advisory role. 
(Although we might note that such a transition can be met with strong resistance.98)   
 
 
V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS  
 
The OBR and the PBO owe their existence to particular confluences of political 
events. The former represents a key policy initiative connected to a critique of the 
previous Government’s supposedly profligate handling of the public finances, an 
issue that became especially pressing after the GFC. The latter happened to be one 
of the demands made by a handful of independent MPs in return for an agreement 
to supply a minority administration.  
For all the serendipity of their origins, the two institutions mirror quite closely 
the two central rationales underlying the global proliferation of IFIs. The OBR, 
under the aegis of the executive (albeit with substantial parliamentary oversight and 
protection) and with a focus on budget forecasting and the long-term sustainability 
of the public finances, reflects the ‘deficit bias’ rationale – the idea that governments 
ought not to be trusted to run the numbers alone (if at all). The PBO, a 
parliamentary body with a focus on supplying MPs with fiscal information 
(including important election costings functions), reflects the ‘information 
asymmetry’ rationale – more especially the idea that legislatures should be 
empowered by making inroads into the executive’s fiscal hegemony (‘legislature-
executive information asymmetry’).  
Once instituted, IFIs are drawn into the game of party political point-scoring. 
We have just seen how the current Australian Labour Party is seeking to use the 
PBO to its advantage. The politics of economic sustainability are equally a source 
of contestation in the UK. In late 2017, Shadow Chancellor John McDonnell 
introduced a policy that the government should include the fiscal risks posed by 
global warming in future economic forecasts. The reform would put climate change 
on an equal footing with other complex challenges affecting the public finances such 
as demography. McDonnell also announced that a future Labour Government 
would give the OBR total independence, allow it to audit party manifestos, and said 
that the forecaster would report directly to Parliament rather than the Treasury.99 
This last initiative is particularly interesting. Not only does it provide more evidence 
for a ‘convergence thesis’ between the two IFIs – since if it were to occur the OBR 
would become, like the PBO, in effect a parliamentary budget office. It also indicates 
the current standing the OBR has among politicians. Given its origins, one could 
                                                      
98 Chohan and Jacobs, ‘Public Value in Politics’, citing the experience of the Canadian PBO.  
99 ‘Labour vows to factor climate change risk into economic forecasts’, The Guardian, 14 November 2017. 
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well imagine the Labour Party to take a much less supportive line towards the 
institution.  
Both are young entities, with presumably much growing still to be done. But it 
looks as though they might be on a path of convergence. The OBR (with the 
support of the Treasury Committee and some MPs) looks to move into election 
policy costing, something that is central to the PBO’s existing mandate. The PBO 
looks as though it might gain an official forecasting role should the Labour Party 
win the next general election, an addition that would align it more closely with the 
OBR. It is unwise to generate descriptive generalisations or predictions on so limited 
a case study. But we introduce, very tentatively at this point, a set of hypotheses that 
we hope to test in future research: (i) whatever its starting point, an IFI will seek to 
add functions to its portfolio; (ii) these will include both more inward-facing 
functions (e.g. official forecasting) and more outward-facing functions (e.g. election 
policy costings); and (iii) this expansion is likely to be facilitated by the logic of inter-
party competition. The extent to which this process of expansion and alignment is 
a transnational phenomenon – whether the product of comparative or copycat 
behaviour and/or as a result of pressure from transnational bodies such as the G20 
– is something we will explore in future work.  
We have made observations about the immediate take-up in political culture, 
but a fuller evaluation of an IFI’s ‘public value’ contribution is only plausible over 
the long term. If we assume that the two IFIs studied in this paper embed 
themselves in the fiscal pathways of the state, it is possible to detect at least one 
serious possible downside about their current operations. The existence of an IFI 
may make it easier for Governments to perform a type of virtue signalling in fiscal 
affairs.100 This is particularly likely where an IFI has a limited remit and performs its 
functions tamely, allowing politicians to talk the talk of fiscal responsibility without 
really facing up to hard choices. Drawing on recent Australian practice, Chohan and 
Jacobs observe that the incantation of terms such as fiscal ‘sustainability’ and 
‘responsibility’ combine with the release of budget documents at regular intervals to 
give contemporary fiscal politics a ritual flavour. Given the contradictory stance that 
citizens often have on issues of expenditure and restraint, politicians can be tempted 
to ‘prioritize between those values that will be addressed through resources and 
those that will be addressed through rhetoric.’101  
The intersection between the genesis of IFIs and the rhetoric of fiscal trust 
politics is revealing. IFIs operate without the hard sanction powers of other 
gatekeepers – e.g. ratings agencies can increase or decrease the cost of borrowing 
through a revision of the institution’s credit rating – and may be said as such to be 
                                                      
100 Critics suggest that this is what has happened in respect of the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council. For 
evaluation see Lars Jonung, Iain Begg and Michael G. Tutty, How is the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council 
Performing? An Independent Evaluation of the First Years of IFAC, (Working Paper 2016:3, Department of 
Economics, Lund University). 
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incapable of imposing any real costs (beyond rhetorical damage) on the 
governments they monitor.102 This more sceptical line of enquiry prompts the 
Aristotelian103 question: are IFIs merely institutions of deliberative rhetoric, to be 
deployed (as a sword) in order to dissuade the demos from following a fiscally 
heterodox politician whose position independent analysis has ‘proved’ will bring 
only bad things or (as a shield) against speculative challengers, enabling the politician 
in power to refute assertions of fiscal incompetence with recourse to ‘independent’ 
fiscal truth?  
Should the rhetoric (as opposed to the reality) of public value take hold in the 
arena of budget politics, one could speculate about where that leaves the goal of 
rebuilding public confidence, the ultimate political goal of the endeavour. Dawn 
Oliver uses the term ‘stewardship’ to capture the constitutional role of various arms-
length public bodies (including the OBR) that provide information or other 
resources to governments.104 But for which constituencies do they act as steward? 
The obvious (but not quite complete) answer is the public. IFIs may be able to serve 
an important role in the democratisation of financial governance. As Annelise Riles 
argues, the technicalities of fiscal decision-making are its core element. To 
democratise the practice requires political debate to be ‘once more technical and more 
political’. Institutions like the OBR and PBO, not least by providing independent and 
transparent fiscal information, can help bring together ‘finance’s many publics’ into 
the political debate at the requisite level of sophistication.105 But that debate does 
not only concern today’s citizens, who constitute only a small – and perhaps 
relatively insignificant – part of the political equation. Alessandro Spano observes 
that ‘if a government decides to finance today’s expenses with long term debt, a 
clear intergenerational clash emerges: today’s generation is going to enjoy a higher 
value whose cost will be paid by tomorrow’s citizens’.106 We argue that IFIs work 
really in the interests of the citizens of the future, as the exceptionally long timelines 
through which IFIs tend to think indicate.  
From the public law perspective, fiscal sustainability is ultimately a question of 
intergenerational constitutional justice. The general idea, though sometimes 
overlooked, is familiar. Burke’s idea that the essential constitutional relationship 
                                                      
102 But, as Philip Pettit reminds us, ‘attitude-dependent goods’ – such as trust or good standing – are 
desirable to agents and so important to society at large. They are also (instrumentally) essential to 
politicians in order to achieve their goals and ultimately to the state if it is to function effectively: ‘The 
Cunning of Trust’ (1995) 24 Philosophy & Public Affairs 202, 212-17. To inflict a sanction on a politician’s 
(or political institution’s) good reputation is thus a material cost.  
103  Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book I, Ch 3, ss 3-4: ‘The deliberative kind [of rhetoric] is either hortatory or 
dissuasive; for both those who give advice in private and those who speak in the assembly invariably 
either exhort or dissuade’. With deliberative forms of rhetoric, there is always a focus on the future: ‘to 
the deliberative the future, for the speaker, whether he exhorts or dissuades, always advises about things 
to come’. 
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Zealand Journal of Public and International Law 21.  
105 Annelise Riles, Collateral Knowledge: Legal Reasoning in the Global Financial Markets (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2011), 223. 
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takes the form of ‘a partnership not only between those who are living, but between 
those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born’107 still 
exerts considerable influence. The French mathematician Condorcet, critical of the 
presentism of much of the incipient democratic theory, provided the prose to 
Burke’s poetry in the form of detailed constitutional specifications for the political 
value of time.108 The IFI represents a similarly detailed and material specification of 
the classic constitutional task of self-binding. It is a technique aimed ultimately at 
retying the now unbound fiscal decision maker to the mast by means of fiscal 
restraints in the interests of future demoi incapable of asserting that capacity but who 
are the inheritors of current fiscal choices.109 The immediate goal is a modest 
resetting of expectations on present decision makers and, by highlighting the impact 
current policies will have on the demos of the future, a subtle reminder that in 
making decisions they bring into view a longer-term horizon. 
                                                      
107 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France [1790]. 
108 See e.g. Elizabeth F. Cohen, The Political Value of Time: Citizenship, Duration, and Democratic Justice 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 68-76. 
109 Jon Elster, Ulysees and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1979). 
